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COPYRIGHTING THE “USEFUL ART” OF COUTURE:
EXPANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
FOR FASHION DESIGNS
“Fashion is not something that exists in dresses only. Fashion is in
the sky, in the street; fashion has to do with ideas, the way we live,
what is happening.”
—Coco Chanel
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INTRODUCTION
To those unfamiliar with the fashion industry, the world of
style—although a frivolous land of superfluous trends and
ridiculous price tags—is a place where runway models pose, teen
girls spend, and all participants coexist in superficial bliss. To
fashion insiders, however, the elegant fashion shows and mall-ratmadness serve only to mask a long-brewing truth: the fashion
industry is at war.
On one side of the battleground stand those who create—a group
composed primarily of designers and creative directors working for
couture fashion houses that service celebrities and the upper
echelon of society.1 For these individuals, the creative design process
is a labor of both love and a commitment of time. On average, it
takes approximately two years for a designer or creative team to
turn a visionary concept into a physical object ready for wear.2 The
first step in this creative process requires designers to predict what
trends will be popular nearly two years into the future when the
final garment will be produced.3 In addition to following color and
textile trends, designers draw further inspiration from studying
street fashion, visiting art museums, traveling to other nations,
keeping track of other design industries, and, most importantly,
using their imaginations.4 Once a designer collects enough inspiration to begin crafting a new design, he uses his knowledge of
garment construction and unique sense of creativity to create a twodimensional sketch dictating the physical creation of the design.5
After he is satisfied with this blueprint, the designer searches for
fabrics and materials that will not only enhance the aesthetic
appearance of the design but also will physically support the actual
creation of the garment.6 Once the designer selects the appropriate
1. See C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion,
61 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1156-57 (2009).
2. See Aleksandra M. Spevacek, Comment, Couture Copyright: Copyright Protection
Fitting for Fashion Design, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 602, 604 (2009).
3. See id.
4. See id. at 604-05.
5. See id. at 605.
6. See id.
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fabric, he uses his sewing skills and artistic knowledge to create a
mock version of the garment, which is later inspected and tailored
by the designer and his creative team.7 Finally, after nearly two
years of innovative effort and technical labor, the designer approves
the article of clothing for public or private manufacture and begins
seeking new inspiration to begin the lengthy design process all over
again.8
Opposing these couture designers on the fashion industry
battleground stand those who copy—mass-producing discount retailers who target fashion-forward twentysomethings on a budget.9
Instead of creating unique designs and signature styles like their
imaginative components, many of these discount retailers instead
focus their efforts on providing their customers with the chance to
purchase designer “knockoffs”—articles of clothing and accessories
that are designed to look like high-end fashion pieces from the
couture runway but are sold at a dramatically more affordable
price.10 Unlike the attention to innovation and careful production
process valued by the designers described above, these fashion
offenders are primarily concerned with strict replication and quick
construction.11 As a result, originality and creativity are often
conspicuously missing from the discount retail production process.12
Take, for example, Forever 21, an American-based mass retail
chain that sells trendy clothing and accessories at an affordable
price.13 Instead of employing fashion designers, Forever 21 hires a
team of “design merchants” who purchase inventory from a wide

7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See Samantha L. Hetherington, Fashion Runways Are No Longer the Public Domain:
Applying the Common Law Right of Publicity to Haute Couture Fashion Design, 24 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 43, 45 (2001).
10. See Lauren Howard, Note, An Uningenious Paradox: Intellectual Property Protections
for Fashion Designs, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 333, 333 (2009) (comparing the widely known
problem of fashion counterfeiting, in which “amateur fashion followers can identify ‘luxury’
goods with glued-on phony labels spewing forth from garbage bags as counterfeits,” with
knockoff fashion).
11. See Hetherington, supra note 9, at 45.
12. See id.
13. See Eva Wiseman, The Gospel According to Forever 21, THE OBSERVER, July 16, 2011,
at 30, available at http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2011/jul/17/forever-21-fastfashion-america (detailing the chain’s “pile very high, sell very cheap” strategy).
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variety of suppliers.14 These suppliers also take a similarly
unimaginative approach to the clothing they produce.15 The owner
of Simonia Fashion, one of the leading suppliers of Forever 21,
described her “design method” simply, explaining, “If I see
something on Style.com, all I have to do is e-mail the picture to my
factory and say, ‘I want something similar, or a silhouette made just
like this.’”16 Another discount retail supplier, Faviana, routinely
sends representatives to take photographs of the red carpet trends
at runway shows and celebrity events and immediately submits
these images to Chinese factories with the capacity to quickly massproduce less expensive copies.17
As a result of this production process that values designer
replication over original creativity, Forever 21 has become known
for supplying low-end alternatives to popular designs from the
runway.18 But these designs do much more than draw general
inspiration from the overall form of high-end pieces; they are true
copies, purposefully indistinguishable from the originals they
emulate.19 Thanks to the striking similarities between many of
Forever 21’s designs and the pieces on which they are so obviously
based, the retail chain has become involved in much litigation
concerning its designs.20 In an attempt to put an end to the
chain’s unapologetic copying, renowned designers like Diane von

14. See Howard, supra note 10, at 341.
15. See id.
16. Id. at 343.
17. See Laura C. Marshall, Note, Catwalk Copycats: Why Congress Should Adopt a
Modified Version of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 305, 310-11
(2007).
18. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 1, at 1172; Howard, supra note 10, at 341-42.
19. See Howard, supra note 10, at 333 (“[T]here are not ersatz Prada logos to be found
within the walls of Forever 21. Yet the intention of the knockoff manufacturer is to create a
product to deceive.”).
20. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 1, at 1173; Charlotte Cowles, Forever 21 Has Never
Been Found Guilty of Copyright Infringement, NEW YORK MAG. (July 18, 2010, 6:30 PM),
http://nymag.com/thecut/2011/07/forever_21_copyright-infringement.html (explaining that
Forever 21 has “faced dozens of copyright infringement lawsuits from around 40 different
designers,” but reiterating that these cases have all been settled out of court); Charlotte
Cowles, Forever 21 Faces Another Copyright-Infringement Lawsuit, NEW YORK MAG. (Aug. 15,
2011, 9:45 AM), http://nymag.com/thecut/2011/07/forever_21_faces_another_copyr.html.
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Furstenberg,21 Betsy Johnson,22 and Anna Sui23 have filed suits
against Forever 21, claiming that the store violated their
intellectual property rights by copying their work.24 Unfortunately
for these designers, their fashion designs—the creative works to
which they devoted time, labor, and imagination—receive little to
no protection from America’s modern intellectual property regime.
As it stands today, no meaningful legal recourse exists to put an end
to Forever 21’s unabashed behavior.25
Whereas previous scholarship concerning this issue has focused
primarily on the reasons fashion designs do or not deserve various
types of intellectual property protection, this Note will attack the
intellectual property framework as a whole in order to illuminate
the reasons why fashion designs can and should receive intellectual
property protection, namely copyright protection. More specifically,
this Note will argue that the current distinction between different
types of intellectual property protection should not present problems
for fashion designs. Part I will explore the unique nature of fashion
designs by considering the ways in which clothing pieces can be
classified as fundamentally different types of objects to different
people and in different situations. Part II will illuminate the ways
in which the context-specific nature of fashion designs make it
difficult for such designs to receive protection from America’s
current intellectual property system. Part III will look to the
historical underpinnings of American intellectual property law to
argue that the unique nature of fashion designs should not serve as
a strict bar to receiving protection. Part IV will examine the
Copyright Act of 1976 along with the Architectural Design
Amendment of 1990 to demonstrate why and how copyright
protection could easily be extended to include fashion designs.
21. See Michael Solomon, Designer Lawsuits, ELLE (Jan. 27, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.
elle.com/pop-culture/best/designer-lawsuits-614883-7#slide-7.
22. See Julie Zerbo, Betsy Johnson v. Forever 21?, FASHION L. (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.
fashion-law.org/2012/08/betsey-johnson-v-forever-21.html.
23. See Amy O’Dell, Forever 21’s Ability to Copy Designer Clothes Could Be in Jeopardy,
NEW YORK MAG. (Apr. 13, 2009, 9:45 AM), http://nymag.com/thecut/2009/04/forever_21s_
ability_to_copy_de.html.
24. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 1, at 1173-74; Cowles, Forever 21 Faces Another
Copyright Infringement Lawsuit, supra note 20.
25. See Marshall, supra note 17, at 330 (exploring the “gap” in intellectual property
protection and encouraging Congress to fill this “void”).
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Finally, Part V will consider the ways in which the changing
landscapes of world custom and technology now require fashion
designs to receive intellectual property protection in order for the
American fashion industry to continue to develop creatively and
economically.
I. DEFINING FASHION: A UTILITARIAN ART FORM
People typically stride through life clothed. Recent proclamations of equal protection and civil liberties aside, 26 clothes are
an unavoidable part of everyone’s life today.27 However,
clothes—“fashion”—mean very different things to different people,
as a result of both situational factors and personal characteristics.28
To begin, clothes can mean different things or be classified as
different types of objects depending on context.29 On the one hand,
imagine a farmer dressed in a flannel shirt, denim overalls, and
work boots while preparing his land for the fall harvest. In this
situation, the farmer’s clothing serves a primarily utilitarian
function.30 The flannel keeps his body warm in the chilly morning
hours, the thick denim of the overalls is both comfortable and
protective, and the sturdy work boots allow the farmer to spend a
long day easily traversing muddy terrain. His clothes are nothing
more than physical articles designed to serve a purpose; they help
him complete his daily tasks in a safe and efficient manner. On the
other hand, imagine an A-list actress wearing a famous designer’s
26. One example of the rebellion against clothes is New York City’s annual “Go-Topless”
Day. See Jonathan Allen, “Go-Topless Day” in New York Seeks Equal Rights to Bear Chests,
REUTERS (Aug. 26, 2012, 4:51 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/26/us-usa-toplessidUSBRE87P0CT20120826.
27. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 1, at 1155 (“Nearly all of us inevitably participate in
fashion, even if we do not try to follow it.”); Marshall, supra note 17, at 307 (quoting Miranda
Priestley’s famous monologue from the 2006 Twentieth Century Fox film The Devil Wears
Prada).
28. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 1, at 1155-59.
29. See id. at 1155 (“Though one may need a replacement pair of jeans when an old pair
gets holes from wear, or a warmer coat when the weather gets cold, for most people across the
socio-economic spectrum, the purchase of clothing is far from limited to these kinds of
situations.”).
30. See Whitney Potter, Comment, Intellectual Property’s Fashion Faux Pas: A Critical
Look at the Lack of Protection Afforded Apparel Design Under the Current Legal Regime, 16
INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 69, 75 (2011).
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original creation while attending the annual Metropolitan Ball in
New York City. The designs for this event are daring and strive to
push the envelope of the fashion industry.31 As bizarre as it may
seem, it is not outside the realm of possibility that a designer would
craft a creation that resembles the farmer’s attire described above.
In this setting, however, the clothing serves little to no utilitarian
function.32 On the steps of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the
actress is merely a dress form or canvas, and the clothing stands
alone—a piece of high Art on living display.33
In addition, personal characteristics of the wearer can affect the
meaning or classification of a given article of clothing.34 Take, for
example, several students selecting an outfit for the first day of
school. One student may intentionally avoid selecting an outfit for
school and will instead simply grab the first thing she finds on the
floor because she is not permitted to arrive at school naked and has
to find something, anything, to cover her body.35 Another student
may diligently check the snowy weather report and consider her
school’s blasting air conditioner before selecting a warm sweatshirt
and woolen socks in an attempt to ensure that her clothes keep her
protected from the elements—both natural and man-made.36 Still
another student may select a tailored oxford and traditional khakis
in an attempt to appear responsible and intelligent to her
conservative professor.37 Finally, one last student may take an hour
crafting the perfect combination of floral Alice + Olivia denim,
oversized vintage chambray blouse, chunky Jeffrey Campbell
platforms, and studded statement necklace because fashion is art
and it matters.38 In each of these cases, every student’s chosen outfit
has a different meaning not only to the wearer but also to the world
at large.39
31. See id. at 74.
32. See id.
33. See Marshall, supra note 17, at 323 (“Fashion designers frequently describe
themselves and their work in artistic terms; they speak of their vision, their inspiration, the
craftsmanship of their clothing, and the theme or message of a particular collection.”).
34. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 1, at 1151, 1157.
35. See id. at 1161.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 1158.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 1151.
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Given both the situational and personal differences that can
affect the characterization of a given fashion object or design, the
true nature of the articles of clothing we drape over our bodies each
day is difficult to describe. In order to arrive at an accurate
description, one large, overarching question must be answered: are
pieces of fashion useful, everyday objects or pieces of high art?40 An
important point to consider in answering this question is the
utilitarian nature of these objects.41 The articles in question can be
classified anywhere on the spectrum of “clothes” (solely utilitarian
objects that have secondary, aesthetic features but exist primarily
to protect our bodies and avoid the exposure of indecent body parts)
to “fashion” (art objects that may happen to serve utilitarian
functions but are created for solely nonutilitarian reasons).42 As the
illustrations above demonstrate, the same object may fall at
different places along this spectrum depending on both situational
and personal contextual factors.43
Unfortunately, the answer to the question posed above has no
effect on the amount of true protection afforded to fashion designs
under America’s current intellectual property regime. Regardless of
whether fashion designs are classified as utilitarian objects or pieces
of art, fashion designers whose work has been copied receive little
legal recourse from the three main branches of intellectual property
law—patent, copyright, and trademark.44 If an article of clothing is
classified as a utilitarian object, patent protection45 is unavailable
for all practical purposes because this recourse applies only to
certain types of true “innovations” and protects only individual
elements of the overall design.46 If, on the other hand, an article of
clothing is classified as an art object, copyright protection is
currently unavailable because fashion designs also serve
unavoidable utilitarian purposes and are not widely accepted as
40. See Potter, supra note 30, at 73.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 74.
43. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 1, at 1157.
44. See Tedmond Wong, Comment, To Copy or Not to Copy, That Is the Question: The
Game Theory Approach to Protecting Fashion Designs, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1139, 1140 (2012).
45. See id. at 1144 (describing that in order to receive a patent, a design must be “truly
novel and nonobvious”).
46. See id.
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“original” in nature.47 Finally, while designers are hypothetically
able to receive trademark protection regardless of whether their
work is classified as utilitarian or artistic, this type of protection
mainly applies to identifiable logos, prints, and textiles, and does
not offer protection for a full fashion design.48
II. THE ART-UTILITY DICHOTOMY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
The majority of the current scholarship concerning fashion and
intellectual property protection has focused either on exposing the
ways in which fashion designs are not art and, as a result, should be
afforded only potential patent protection,49 or on illuminating the
ways in which fashion designs are art and, as a result, should
receive copyright protection as well.50 Trademark law aside,51
intellectual property protection is structured around this functional
dichotomy that forces objects with both utilitarian and artistic
possibilities to “pick a side” on the usefulness spectrum created by
current patent and copyright law.52 If an object is placed on the
utilitarian side of the spectrum, patent protection becomes the only
potentially available recourse.53 If, on the other hand, the object is
placed on the artistic side of the spectrum, copyright protection
becomes available.54
47. See id. at 1145 (“Copyright would seem to apply to fashion designs because by
statutory definition its subject matter includes ‘original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression’.... However, an article of clothing, which represents an original
design in a fixed form, cannot receive copyright protection because clothing is ‘utilitarian’ in
nature.” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006))).
48. See id. at 1142 (describing that while trademark protection can protect “certain
elements” of a fashion design, the trademark does not extend “to the entire fashion design”).
49. See Kari Heyison, Comment, If It’s Not Ripped, Why Sew It? An Analysis of Why
Enhanced Intellectual Property Protection for Fashion Design Is in Poor Taste, 28 TOURO L.
REV. 255, 274-82 (2012).
50. See Marshall, supra note 17, at 322.
51. In order to receive trademark protection, the design in question must incorporate
some sort of readily identifiable pictorial or graphic design that exists independently outside
of the functional nature of the article (such as a logo or print like the famous Louis Vuitton
monogram). See Potter, supra note 30, at 76-77. Logos of course can receive protection, but
this sort of protection will rarely extend to full “designs.” See id. at 77.
52. See Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Fashion Design, in 1 INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 115, 118 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007).
53. See id. at 122.
54. See id. at 120.
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A. Patent Protection
On one end of the intellectual property spectrum is patent law,
which provides protection to objects utilitarian in nature.55 A patent
is a set of exclusive rights granted by the state to an inventor for a
limited period of time in exchange for the disclosure of his
invention.56 Although patents can be used to protect “any useful art,
manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement
therein not before known or used,”57 patent law imposes strict
requirements.
To acquire a patent, an invention or design must meet five
requirements: the patentable subject matter requirement, the utility
requirement, the novelty requirement, the description requirement,
and the non-obviousness requirement.58 Passing this initial
threshold is difficult for any object, and is especially so for fashion
designs.59 While a fashion design may present a patentable subject
that is novel, fulfills a utilitarian function, and is able to be clearly
and concisely described, it is difficult to imagine a fashion design
that meets the statutory test for “non-obviousness.”60
According to the section of the U.S. Code governing patent law, an
invention or design is obvious, and thus must be denied patent
protection, if “the differences between the subject matter sought to
be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains.”61 In Graham v. John Deere Co., the Supreme
Court addressed the non-obviousness requirement for the first
time.62 Interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 103, the Court held that the
obviousness of an invention or design is determined by looking at
55. See Elizabeth Ferrill & Tina Tanhehco, Protecting the Material World: The Role of
Design Patents in the Fashion Industry, 12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 251, 277 (2011).
56. Biana Borukhovich, Note, Fashion Design: The Work of Art That Is Still Unrecognized
in the United States, 9 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 155, 163 (2009).
57. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3242 (2010) (quoting Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch.7, 1
Stat. 109-10 (repealed 1793)).
58. See Borukhovich, supra note 56, at 163.
59. See id. at 164.
60. See id.
61. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
62. 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
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the “differences between the prior art and the claims at issue ... and
the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved.”63 The Court
took a more nuanced approach to the non-obviousness requirement
in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., holding that in
determining obviousness “a court must ask whether the
improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements
according to their established functions.”64 These tests in mind, a
nonobvious fashion design is difficult to conceptualize with respect
to the established functionality of elements commonly used in the
fashion industry.65 While a design may be nonobvious in its
aesthetic considerations or its overall appearance, fashion designs
rarely fulfill nonobvious functions.66 As fashion advocate Keri
Heyison hypothesizes, in order to meet this requirement of nonobviousness, “[o]ne would have to create a completely new type of
clothing; and unless the public is in the market for a fingernail
warmer, one can imagine how difficult that would be.”67
In the rare case in which a fashion design is able to pass this fivepart threshold test, it is protected by either a utility patent or a
design patent. “[A] utility patent protects any new invention or
functional improvements on existing inventions,” whereas a design
patent protects an invention’s “ornamental design, configuration,
improved decorative appearance, or shape.”68 When seeking
intellectual protection, most designers choose a design patent to
protect their work.69 Unfortunately, however, design patents extend
protection only to the “non-functional” elements of a functional
design.70 In other words, a design patent may provide protection to
63. See id.
64. 550 U.S. 398, 401 (2007).
65. See Scafidi, supra note 52, at 122.
66. See id.
67. Heyison, supra note 49, at 260; see Scafidi, supra note 52, at 122 (describing how
Velcro, zippers, Lycra, Kevlar, hazmat gear, and spacesuits have all received patent
protection).
68. Borukhovich, supra note 56, 163 (quoting R. Kayne, What Is the Difference Between
a Design Patent and a Utility Patent?, WISEGEEK (2003), http://www.wisegeek.com/what-isthe-difference-between-a-design-patent-and-a-utility-patent.htm); see 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 171
(2006).
69. Alissandra Burack, Comment, Is Fashion an Art Form That Should Be Protected or
Merely a Constantly Changing Media Encouraging of Popular Trends?, 17 VILL. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 605, 613 (2010). But see Heyison, supra note 49, at 261.
70. Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 1985).
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an ornamental element of a fashion design, but these patents are
unable to protect the garment design as a whole. As a result,
although design patents have been used to provide protection for
several accessory designs, such as “shoes, handbags, belts, ...
headgear, and eyeglass frames, design patents are unable to provide
fashion designers with the type of protection necessary to stop
fashion copycats from replicating their garment designs.71
Even if a fashion design is able to meet the stringent patent
requirements and is somehow able to benefit from the limited,
nonfunctional protection afforded by design patents, there are other
practical complications that make patents an incompatible
mechanism for protecting fashion designs. For one, the process of
obtaining a patent is lengthy in comparison to the time required to
obtain other forms of intellectual property protection.72 On average,
it takes over two years for the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
to officially grant a patent to a deserving applicant.73 In a world as
fast-paced and constantly evolving as the fashion industry, patents
may prove largely obsolete in actually providing designers with
meaningful protection from copycat retailers who are able to
respond to runway shows and copy designs with astounding
quickness.74 By the time a patent is awarded to a couture designer,
Forever 21 will have already provided consumers with exact replicas
of the patented design and fashion followers will have already
moved their eyes and wallets forward to the next big trend.75
In addition, the process of obtaining a patent is extremely costly.76
Practically speaking, applying for and potentially obtaining patent
protection is only available to well-established and successful
71. Ferrill & Tanhehco, supra note 55, at 278.
72. See Julie P. Tsai, Comment, Fashion Protection: A Note on the Protection of Fashion
Design in the United States, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 447, 457 (2005). But see Ferrill &
Tanhehco, supra note 55, at 281.
73. Heyison, supra note 49, at 260.
74. See Kristin L. Black, Crimes of Fashion: Is Imitation Truly the Sincerest Form of
Flattery?, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 505, 507 (2010); Potter, supra note 30, at 76; Wong, supra
note 44, at 1144-45 (“Even if a fashion designer can meet the statutory requirements, the
patent system presents a further obstacle to protecting fashion designs: timing.”).
75. See Ferrill & Tanhehco, supra note 55, at 263 n.62 (quoting Nicole Giambarrese,
Comment, The Look for Less: A Survey of Intellectual Property Protections in the Fashion
Industry, 26 TOURO L. REV. 243, 243-244 (2010)). See generally Burack, supra note 69, at 623.
76. See Tsai, supra note 72, at 455.
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designers and couture design houses who can afford covering both
the upfront application expenses and shouldering the high risk that
the PTO will refuse to grant a patent entirely. As a result of these
procedural setbacks, design patents—even when available—provide
an impractical and often unworkable method of providing
intellectual property protection to fashion designs.77
If fashion designs are indeed deemed only utilitarian (and not
artistic) in nature, the patent-protection system described in this
section will constitute the only intellectual property recourse
available to fashion designers whose work has been copied. As
explained above, however, patent protection is clearly ill-equipped
to adequately protect fashion designs. Why is this so? Why is patent
law able to provide sufficient intellectual property protection to
other utilitarian innovations, but not to “utilitarian” fashion
designs? The answer to these questions is simple: fashion is also art.
While critics argue that it is fashion’s lack of artistry that makes
patent protection more appropriate than other protective
measures,78 attempting to actually apply patent protection to
fashion designs exposes the very ways in which every fashion
design, taken as a whole, is unavoidably artistic. The difficulty that
fashion designs face in overcoming the nonobvious requirement
necessary to receive patent protection exposes the ways in which
their aesthetic elements or artistic purposes are often more unique
or nonobvious than their functional components. The fact that
design patents are unable to protect the very wrongs fashion
designers seek to right—the unauthorized copying of their overall
design schemes—showcases the ways in which patent law’s ability
to protect only truly original functions allows copycats to continue
stealing designers’ artistic creations. Additionally, the ways in
which the procedural complications associated with securing design
protection practically inhibit designers from receiving meaningful
relief highlight fashion’s place in the temperamental and trenddriven world of art.

77. See Borukhovich, supra note 56, at 164-65 (describing the time-consuming process of
getting a patent and the expensive fees necessary to even apply for patent protection).
78. See Jennifer E. Smith, Flattery or Fraud: Should Fashion Designers Be Granted
Copyright Protection?, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 1, 3 (2007).
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B. Copyright Protection
On the other end of the intellectual property utility spectrum is
copyright law, which provides protection to objects artistic in
nature.79 “[C]opyright protection extends to original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium.”80 As with patent
protection, however, copyright protection extends only to specific
kinds of artistic objects that possess certain prerequisite features.
In order to receive copyright protection, a given object must meet
the requirement of separability and the requirement of originality.81
Separability is a prerequisite that requires the functional and
aesthetic elements of an object to exist independently of each
other.82 In essence, the separability requirement ensures that
copyright protection does not extend to “useful articles,” or those
having intrinsic utilitarian functions that go beyond portraying the
appearance of an article or conveying information.83 When making
a determination as to whether a given article is a useful one, it is
important to note that an article that is normally a part of a useful
article is itself considered to be a useful article.84 In other words, “if
design elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and functional
considerations, the artistic aspects of a work cannot be said to be
conceptually separable from the utilitarian elements.”85 The other
major requirement necessary for copyright protection, originality,
is a prerequisite that requires a work to be sufficiently unique and
different from previous works.86 Heated debate surrounds the ability
of fashion designs to meet both copyright requirements.87
79. See Black, supra note 74, at 513.
80. Heyison, supra note 49, at 267 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006)).
81. Universal Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. Collezioni Europa USA, Inc., 618 F.3d 417, 429 (4th
Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (summarizing the elements necessary to protect a copyright).
82. See Borukhovich, supra note 56, at 165.
83. See id. (defining a useful article as one that has “an intrinsic utilitarian function that
is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information” (quoting 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2008))).
84. See id. at 165 (explaining that “‘pictorial, graphic, or sculptural’ features of a design”
are “copyrightable if those features are physically or conceptually separable from the useful
features of the product” (emphasis added) (quoting Marshall, supra note 17, at 315)).
85. Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987);
Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 1985).
86. See Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
87. See generally Potter, supra note 30.

2014]

COPYRIGHTING THE “USEFUL ART” OF COUTURE

1631

In terms of the separability requirement, there are critics and
case law to support both the proposition that utilitarian and
aesthetic aspects of fashion designs are totally separable and the
proposition that they are not.88 Those who support the idea that
fashion designs are separable from their utilitarian functions are
vocal and passionate. As one such supporter, legal scholar and
fashion advocate Susan Scafidi, remarked, “A ball gown is a work of
art. What else are you going to do with it? Clean the house?”89
Several circuit courts have also recognized fashion’s separability
potential. In Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., the court
held that a belt buckle was separable from its function as part of a
belt designed to ensure that pants remain resting securely on one’s
hips.90 In a case easily analogizable to fashion design issues of
separability, the court in Universal Furniture International, Inc. v.
Collezione Europa USA, Inc. held that the form and ornamentation
of a decorative piece of furniture were separable from its utilitarian
function as a chair that people used to rest their bodies and sit.91
On the other hand, other scholars and courts have claimed that
clothing is inherently utilitarian in nature, holding that the artistic
and utilitarian aspects of fashion designs are not separable.92
According to these critics, a garment placed on a human body
inevitably fulfills the utilitarian functions of protecting and
concealing the body regardless of the design’s aesthetic purpose or
visual qualities. Whereas courts have openly granted copyright
protection to both fabric designs93 and to lace embroidery,94 they
have extended this protection along with the cautioning caveat that
fashion designs, when taken as a whole, are utilitarian in nature
and therefore should not be offered copyright protection.95
In terms of the originality requirement, arguments exist both in
favor of and against the possibility that fashion designs may exist
88. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980).
89. Borukhovich, supra note 56, at 156 (quoting Laura Goldman, Fashion Piracy,
BPCOUNCIL, 2007).
90. 632 F.2d at 993.
91. 618 F.3d 417, 426 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
92. See Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 1985).
93. Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995).
94. Express, LLC v. Fetish Grp., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1224 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
95. Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1002; Express, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 1124.
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as truly original objects. Fashion designs have the potential to be
original, particularly when they are compared to other copyrighteligible objects.96 The most widely drawn comparison is that
between fashion designs and works of literature. Any piece of
English literature, for example, is composed of words. These words
(and sentence structures, rhetorical devices, etc.) are all drawn from
a relatively finite “master list.” Authors draw from this unoriginal
master list but are simultaneously able to combine unoriginal words
in unique ways to create works of art that as a whole are
remarkably original. Creating fashion designs operates much in the
same way as creating pieces of literature. Designers draw from a
preexisting vocabulary of color, pattern, form, and shape, and some
talented designers are able to craft these elements together in ways
that create works that are unmistakably original in overall design.
On the other end of the spectrum, similar logic can be employed
to argue that fashion designs do not have the potential to be
original.97 In other words, because fashion designs necessarily
involve drawing inspiration from an industry-wide vocabulary of
color, form, and texture, some critics ignore similarly situated
copyright-protected mediums and argue that it is inherently
impossible for a fashion design to achieve the high level of
originality required for copyright protection to apply.98
Despite the individuals and institutions that claim that fashion
designs have the ability to be both separable and original, the
overwhelming trend in copyright litigation today is to refuse to
extend copyright protection to fashion designs.99 With this in mind,
the same questions that arose when exploring patent law’s
applicability to fashion designs arise in the copyright context as
well: why is copyright law able to provide sufficient intellectual
property protection to other artistic innovations, but not to “artistic”

96. See, e.g., D’Lesli M. Davis, The Copyright Primer for the Lawyer Who Doesn’t Even
Know How to Spell Copywrite, Er, Copyright, ADVOC., Winter 2008, at 31, 32 (describing other
copyright-eligible objects).
97. See, e.g., Lori Schutte, Copyright for Couture, 2011 DUKE. L. & TECH. REV. 11, *12,
¶ 22.
98. See Heyison, supra note 49, at 269.
99. Wong, supra note 44, at 1146 (“[F]ashion designs have not yet fallen within the ambit
of copyright.”).
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fashion designs?100 The answer, once again, is simple: fashion is also
useful.
Attempting to apply copyright protection to fashion designs
exposes the very ways in which every fashion design is unavoidably
utilitarian.101 In their inability to meet the requirement of
separability, fashion designs showcase the ways in which they can
never truly divorce themselves from their utilitarian functions, no
matter how contextually inconsequential they may be. In addition,
the fact that the unoriginal fashion “dictionary” is composed of
individual design elements—straps, skirt length, fabric choice, etc.
that have come to exist within this vocabulary for functional
reasons, such as supporting a garment or providing
warmth—demonstrates the way in which the originality
requirement is similarly constrained by fashion’s potential
functionality.
C. Fashion: An Unprotected Object of Art and Utility
As a result of the current intellectual property protection
framework, fashion designers are left with no realistic legal defense
with which to protect themselves against the growing mass-market
trend of blatantly copying couture designs.102 The modern system,
which is designed around a strict dichotomy between useful and
artistic objects, unfairly forces items that are useful in one context
to suffer from the ways in which the same objects might be artistic
in another context (and vice versa).103 While fashion designs deemed
primarily utilitarian in nature can never escape their artistic
potential in order to receive a relevant design patent, fashion
designs deemed artistic in nature can never escape their potentially
utilitarian functions in order to receive copyright protection.

100. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
101. But see Arielle K. Cohen, Designer Collaborations as a Solution to the Fast-Fashion
Copyright Dilemma, 11 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 172, 177 (2012).
102. See Katelyn Brandes, Note, Design Protection in the United States and European
Union: Piracy’s Detrimental Effects in the Digital World, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1115, 1116
(2012) (describing how designers “face competition from large corporate entities that rapidly
replicate their designs with minimal, if any, legal restraint”).
103. See supra Part I-II.B.
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In order to combat this problem, fashion advocates have proposed
various solutions to disincentivize mass retail chains from copying
couture designs without permission.104 The legal system, however,
should not be forced to invent “solutions” like these when America
already has a long-standing intellectual property framework in
place.
III. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE THAT DISPELS THIS DICHOTOMY
By reviewing a brief history of the sources of intellectual property
law, this Part will demonstrate that the strict notions of
utilitarianism and artistry105 that constrain modern intellectual
property litigation are abstract, fictional, and truly unrelated to
determining what objects or designs should be eligible to receive
potential protection.
A. The Statute of Anne
The first major source of copyright protection is British copyright
law.106 The British Statute of Anne, enacted in 1710, was the first
statute that granted the government the power to control copyright
issues. The statute reads:
Whereas Printers Booksellers and other Persons have of late
frequently taken the Liberty of printing reprinting and
publishing or causing to be printed reprinted and published
books and other Writings without the Consent of the Authors or
Proprietors of such Books and Writings to their very great
Detriment and too often to the Ruin of them and their Families
For preventing therefore such Practices for the future, and for
104. See Cohen, supra note 101, at 173, 183-85 (proposing a more widespread use of highend designer collaborations with lower-end retail stores as a way to give designers control and
discourage these chains from copying their couture works). However, this argument does not
resolve the issue at hand. Requiring designers to design additional clothes—expending both
time and resources—is not an efficient way to protect their preexisting designs. This process
is both wasteful and insufficient to solve the actual problem.
105. See Potter, supra note 30, at 74-75 (explaining how the original purpose of the
tapestry, a form of expression protected by the Copyright Act, was largely utilitarian).
106. Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The
Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution,
2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 17 (1994).
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the Encouragement of learned Men to compose and write useful
Books May it please Your Majesty, that it may be enacted.107

Taken on its own, the language highlighted above demonstrates
that eighteenth-century English lawmakers associated usefulness
or utilitarianism with books, objects which are currently afforded
(artistic) copyright protection in America’s intellectual property
regime.108 This illuminates the way in which almost every artistic
object performs an arguably useful function. A book, for example,
may inform its readers how to complete a technical project, may
educate its readers about historical events or religious tenets, or
may entertain its readers when they are finally able to take a break
from a hard day’s work and spend a leisurely night immersing
themselves in a good story. By using the word “useful” as an
adjective to describe the modern-day, copyright-protected medium
of books, the Statute of Anne expressly rejects that idea that utility
and artistry are easily separable. Instead, the language of the
statute recognizes that all arts are inherently useful in some way;
that any separation between “art” and “utilitarian object” is
necessarily abstract.
This language in mind, the historical underpinnings and purposes
underlying the Statute of Anne further serve to break down the artutility dichotomy that grounds American intellectual property law.
For one, this statute was created primarily to protect authors, both
financially and socially, by preserving their individual
reputations.109 With protection of authorship as a primary goal, a
practical interpretation of this statute should honor this intent and
err on the side of granting more—instead of less—protection to
creators. Secondly, this statute was enacted to encourage innovation
and “usefulness.”110 And allowing creators of different types of
objects, including those with both utilitarian and artistic functions,
to receive protection will surely result in an increase of innovation
across all fields of study and creation. The more types of innovations
are allowed protection, the more innovators will expend time and
107.
108.
109.
(2010).
110.

8 Ann., c. 21 (Eng.) (emphasis added).
See Black, supra note 74, at 513.
Oren Bracha, The Statute of Anne: An American Mythology, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 877, 884
See supra text accompanying note 108.
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resources to contribute to a given field in a significant way.111 As a
result of these general goals that the Statute of Anne seeks to
advance, America’s current trend of forcing objects to find their
definitive place on the art-utility spectrum is clearly an exercise as
artificial as is it unproductive.
B. The Constitution of the United States
Drawing inspiration in both language and purpose from the
Statute of Anne,112 the section of the United States Constitution that
grants Congress the ability to pass legislation aimed at protecting
inventors and creators is Article I, Section 8, Clause 8,113 which
states that Congress shall have the power “[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”114
In order to understand the language used by the Framers in
drafting Clause 8, a brief history lesson is necessary regarding
eighteenth-century meanings of both “Science” and “useful Arts.”
Although it may appear counterintuitive, at the time of the
Constitution’s drafting, the term “useful Art[ ]” was used to describe
inventions and scientific or technological progress while the term
“Science” was meant as a reference to human knowledge generally,
presumably including the fine arts.115 Although this disparity may
initially tempt scholars and theorists to hold fast to the art-utility
distinction, in truth this nomenclature mismatch demonstrates the
easily blurred line that separates the not-so-distant realms of
utilitarian “useful Arts” and artistic “Sciences.” In addition, Clause
8’s twin terms are not limited by specific adjectives or accompanied
by predetermined requirements. Interpreting this language, the
Court in Golan v. Holder held that the Constitution gives Congress

111. See Schutte, supra note 97, at *13-14, ¶ 25.
112. Bracha, supra note 109, at 912; Walterscheid, supra note 106, at 36.
113. David R. Ellis, Cyberlaw and Computer Technology: A Primer on the Law of
Intellectual Property Protection, FLA. B.J., Jan. 1998, at 34, 35 (describing the law of
copyrights as a “statutory scheme of protection dating back almost 200 years in this country
to the Constitution”).
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
115. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3243-44 (2010); Walterscheid, supra note 106, at 51.
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broad discretion to protect works generally, meaning that Congress
can easily give more protection if need be.116
The purposes underlying Clause 8 are similar to those that
motivated the Statute of Anne.117 Much like the English statute, the
express purpose of this provision is to promote the progress of
“Sciences and the useful Arts.”118 In addition, the Framers also
intended the clause to protect and promote industry as a whole.119
This in mind, history has proven that fashion is one of a handful of
globally connected industries that has the ability to affect America’s
economy.120 Any distinction between utilitarian and artistically
driven industries is therefore irrelevant in determining a given
industry’s value to American culture and economy.
IV. EXTENDING COPYRIGHT PROTECTION TO FASHION DESIGNS
Given not only the primary historical sources of intellectual
property law described above, but also the way in which both of
these sources expose the deficiencies of an intellectual property
system structured around a strict art-utility dichotomy, current
American legislation dictating the specific requirements necessary
to receive protection begins to appear unnecessarily concerned with
forcing objects to “pick a side.” The next step in advocating for the
extension of protection to fashion designs is to analyze current
American legislation governing intellectual property in order to see
how easily fashion designs may be incorporated into the preexisting
system. With the procedural setbacks associated with obtaining a
patent in mind, the best avenue for securing fashion designers with
meaningful protection is the Copyright Act of 1976.

116. See 132 S. Ct. 873, 884-85, 888 (2012).
117. William Cornish, The Statute of Anne 1709-10: Its Historical Setting, in GLOBAL
COPYRIGHT: THREE HUNDRED YEARS SINCE THE STATUTE OF ANNE, FROM 1709 TO CYBERSPACE
14, 21-22 (Lionel Bently et al. eds., 2010).
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
119. See Heyison, supra note 49, at 282 (“Expanding protection would have devastating
effects on this country’s economy, the industry as a whole, the designer’s pockets, and most
notably and visibly, our society.”).
120. See Potter, supra note 30, at 69 (describing the massive economic impact that the
fashion industry, which sells approximately $784 billion worth of apparel each year, has on
America and the world economy at large).
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The Copyright Act of 1976 proclaims, “copyright protection
subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device.”121 The Act originally defined “works of
authorship” as (1) “literary works; (2) musical works, including any
accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5)
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6)motion pictures and
other audiovisual works; and (7) sound recordings.”122 Taken with
the separability and originality requirements described above, this
language ensures that only works on the far “artistic” end of the
spectrum are able to receive copyright protection. However, even as
the original Act continued to blindly adhere to the strict art-utility
dichotomy, a major amendment to the Act showcases the ways in
which such a rigid intellectual property framework is both artificial
and unworkable.
A. The Architectural Design Amendment of 1990
The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act was added in
1990 and amended the Copyright Act to include “architectural
works” as works of authorship.123 This new medium is defined in the
amendment, which states that an “architectural work” is the “design
of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression,
including a building, architectural plans, or drawings.”124 Such a
work includes “the overall form as well as the arrangement and

121. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
122. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. 11 1976)).
123. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5133 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101-02(a) (Supp. 11 1990))
(“An ‘architectural work’ is the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of
expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings. The work includes the
overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design,
but does not include individual standard features.”).
124. Id. The leading case addressing architectural copyright protection is Yankee Candle
Co. v. New England Candle Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 154, 159-60 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding that the
Yankee Candle Co. store was an internal structure and did not qualify as a building).
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composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does not
include individual standard features.”125
Obvious comparisons can be made between architecture and
fashion in terms of both separability and originality. In terms of
separability, architectural works operate much like fashion
designs—no matter how beautiful or ornamental an architectural
design may be, it unavoidably has the capacity to fulfill the basic
utilitarian function of providing shelter. In an attempt to sidestep
this problem, the Architectural Design Amendment leaves
separability largely unaddressed.126 Artistic notions aside, works of
architecture provide the unavoidable function of providing shelter
regardless of their artistic value. Regardless, these works are now
provided copyright protection despite their utilitarian nature.
In terms of originality, the same basic principles apply to the
originality of works of architecture that apply to fashion designs.
They are both a type of three-dimensional visual art that is
comprised of various elements—color, shape, form, and
texture—and is intensely detail-oriented. The Architectural Design
Amendment handles the issue of originality directly; the statutory
language clearly states that the term “architectural works” does not
include individual standard features, but instead looks to the overall
composition and form of the design and building.127 This same
standard could be used to determine the originality of fashion
designs as well.
For example, imagine a four-story brick building centered around
a spiraling staircase that leads to a pointed lookout needle. Many
building designs may include each of these individual elements, but
perhaps no building has combined the elements together to create
the same overall effect. Under the Architectural Design Amendment
to the Copyright Act, this type of total uniqueness is sufficient for a
finding of originality. In the similarly situated world of fashion, take
a long, flowy dress with thin straps, a plunging v-neck, an elaborate
floral detail, and distinctive black borders. Each of these elements
standing on its own may not be “original”: Many dresses are long
and flowy. Many dresses have thin straps. Many dresses have
125. 17 U.S.C. § 101(a).
126. See Spevacek, supra note 2, at 610 (explaining that courts considering architectural
designs are not required to apply the separability test).
127. 17 U.S.C. § 101(a).
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plunging v-necks. Many dresses have elaborate floral detailing.
Finally (and not surprisingly at this point), many dresses have
distinctive black borders. All of this unoriginality in mind, it is also
possible that no other dress has combined the individual elements
in this way before, so the dress taken as a whole design is original.
It is important to note that not every fashion design would be
original enough to garner copyright protection (just as not every
architectural design would be original enough to receive protection);
each design must be evaluated on its own merits. However, an
important takeaway is that the legislature has already determined
that it is possible to determine whether an object comprised of
“unoriginal” elements can still be original when these elements are
combined in a new and distinct way.
This comparison to original architecture in mind, it is important
to consider the ways in which courts have construed the concept of
originality. For example, in Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co.,
the Court held that when a total concept is the same, copyright may
be infringed.128 This holding is significant because it implies that
designs that, as a whole, are too closely identical to another design,
can still be deemed to infringe upon the first design’s copyright even
if there are small differences between the two (namely fabric or
threading).
If these “prerequisites”—designed to keep objects with utilitarian
characteristics from receiving the benefit of copyright
protection—can so easily be forgotten when it comes to architectural
designs,129 why should critics constantly cite them as unavoidable
bars against giving copyright protection to fashion designs? Clearly,
the legislature has begun to realize the artificiality of the art-utility
distinction underlying America’s intellectual property regime and
started to carve out specialized exceptions to this general rule.130 In
order to argue that the current American intellectual property
system should be expanded in order to make fashion designs
copyright-eligible, the remainder of this Part will attack the

128. See Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
129. See Spevacek, supra note 2, at 610. (“Despite the fact that architectural designs are
generally composed of elements that cannot be separated from their utilitarian functions,
architectural designs are still afforded protection.”).
130. See id. at 612-13.
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nonutilitarian justifications most often cited in opposition to
extending copyright protection to fashion designs.
B. Dispelling Miscellaneous Arguments in Opposition to
Extending Copyright Protection to Fashion Designs
In light of the inclusion of the similarly-situated medium of
architecture, it is necessary to consider other arguments—aside
from the originality and separability arguments most often
cited—advanced as justifications as to why fashion designs should
be denied copyright protection.
One reason why fashion designs might still be given different
protection concerns the role that socioeconomics play in the
industry.131 By providing copyright protection to fashion designers,
some critics claim that the legislature will be facilitating a greater
divide between American social classes.132 If only extremely well-todo people from the upper crust of society are able to buy couture
designs and lower classes are unable to purchase corresponding
knockoffs at a more affordable price, some critics claim that
disparities in fashion choice will serve as a further divide between
classes.133 However, this argument relies on faulty stereotypes about
both copyright protection and universal financial priorities. Many
of the designs that would pass the originality test necessary to
warrant copyright protection are not necessarily everyday outfits
that common individuals from any class would wear. Providing
copyright protection to original designs would not bar other
designers or even discount retailers from drawing influence from
these copyrighted designs.134 While these designers would not be
allowed to create direct copies of fashion designs, they could still
draw inspiration from them and allow individuals to experience
basic runway trends at a more affordable price point.135 Copyright
protection would also be available to lower-end designers. Although
much of the current litigation is focused on low-end retailers copying
131. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 1, at 1149-51.
132. See Burack, supra note 69, at 607.
133. See id. at 605 (“The knockoff industry targets consumers who do not want to pay high
prices for designer merchandise.”).
134. See Cohen, supra note 101, at 184.
135. See id. at 184-85.
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the work of high-end designers, designers creating fashion designs
with a lower price point also may be copied by designers from a
similar market or even by higher-end designers. Additionally,
people with different amounts of financial resources often spend
their money in different ways. Sometimes people with large
amounts of money refuse to buy expensive clothing, while
sometimes people with less will skimp in other areas of their life to
ensure that they can still purchase expensive clothing.136 As a
result, what type of clothing one wears—or how much it costs—is
not always an accurate indicator of one’s social class.
Other critics claim that fashion designs should be denied
copyright protection because giving designs this protection might
“contravene [ ] the basic principles of copyright.”137 However,
granting fashion designs protection will further, not compromise,
the objectives of the Copyright Act.138 The Copyright Act is designed
to protect creative expression and encourage people to continue to
use innovative thought in order to “promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts.”139 Although some may argue that fashion designs
are not totally separable or original, they still remain items of
“creative expression.”140 In other words, even if one does not believe
that fashion designs should receive copyright protection for
technical reasons, it does not necessarily follow that providing
fashion designs this protection will go so far as to breach the
broader principles upon which copyright protection is based.
A third reason often cited for denying copyright protection to
fashion designs is that providing this protection could lead to
increased complaints and litigation.141 However, this argument is
based on the faulty principle that providing more causes of action
will necessarily lead to an increased number of complaints. In
reality, providing additional copyright protection will likely not
affect the amount of litigation brought to handle copyright issues.142
As discussed earlier, there is already a substantial amount of
136. See id. at. 182.
137. See Jennifer E. Smith, Flattery or Fraud: Should Fashion Designers Be Granted
Copyright Protection?, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 1, 1 (2007).
138. See Potter, supra note 30, at 85.
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
140. See Potter, supra note 30, at 74.
141. See Schutte, supra note 97, at*12, ¶21.
142. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 1, at 1176, 1188-89.
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litigation concerning fashion designs and copyright.143 Although this
litigation is not successful, this does not mean that it is not already
in existence. In other words, many fashion designers are already
bringing copyright claims against competitors, and this dismissed
litigation is burdensome for the parties and courts alike. More
intellectual property protection will give designers a chance to win
already ongoing litigation; it would not create more.144 Finally,
because the same few retail brands are the copyists sued time and
time again, it would take only one successful lawsuit against a chain
like Forever 21 to put an end to their behavior and subsequently
decrease future litigation.
The final nonseparable and nonoriginal reason often used to
rationalize the exclusion of fashion designs from the Copyright Act
is the hypothesis that knockoffs actually encourage creativity and
innovation by forcing fashion designers to constantly reinvent their
line in an attempt to stay relevant and original. Other scholars have
directly rebutted this argument, explaining that knockoffs do
nothing to boost creativity at any fashion price point.145 In the world
of high-end fashion, designers are in a constant state of innovation.
Fashion Week, an industry-wide event that takes place twice a year,
forces designers to constantly evolve and reinvent themselves in
order to remain relevant in the eyes of the critical high-fashion
community. Fashion Week is an ever-looming, biyearly event that
forces creativity and innovation. Accordingly, any creativity thought
to be inspired by the threat of knockoffs is misattributed. On the
more affordable end of the fashion spectrum, the high prevalence of
knockoffs has done the exact opposite of inspiring creativity. Instead
of exploring their own ideas and original thought, designers not
associated with couture houses haven given up and now spend their
efforts and resources directly copying the creativity of others.

143. See supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text (discussing briefly the various suits
brought against Forever 21 over the past decade).
144. See supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text.
145. See Howard, supra note 10, at 354-55.
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V. THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF FASHION DESIGN: FURTHER
NECESSITATING THE NEED FOR FUTURE PROTECTION
With the oft-cited justifications against expanding copyright
protection to fashion designs dispelled, the changing landscape of
world custom and technology provide further justifications for
extending copyright protection to fashion designs.146 Legislation,
copyright legislation included, is designed to provide a constant
process of revision and amendment in order to accommodate
changing norms and circumstances.147 The Copyright Act of 1976 is
itself a reformed version of the Copyright Act of 1909. The 1976
revision was enacted in large part as a response to new technologies
and the new challenges these media created.148 In addition to this
type of complete overhaul, amendments have also been added to the
Copyright Protection Act to respond to continually evolving
technology and ideals.149 One important and already-discussed
example of this constant cycle of revision is the Architectural Design
Amendment, which was enacted in response to the United States
joining the Berne Convention and attempting to keep stride with
important international copyright standards.150
In light of Congress’s ability to revise and amend current
legislation in response to changing norms, it is necessary to explore
the advancements that have created a greater need for fashion
design protection.151 First, Congress has often looked to other
countries’ progress for inspiration, such as its inclusion of
architectural designs into the Copyright Act through the United

146. See Susan Scafidi, F.I.T.: Fashion Information Technology, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 69,
87-88 (2008).
147. See Elizabeth A. Brainard, Note, Innovation and Imitation: Artistic Advance and the
Legal Protection of Architectural Works, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 81, 85 (1984).
148. See Herbert J. Hammond, Intellectual Property, 19 TEX. TECH L. REV. 707, 707-08
(1988) (explaining that when the 1909 Copyright Act was enacted, it was impossible to
imagine scientific progress like computers and the Internet and the effect that these changing
technologies have had on copyright protection).
149. See, e.g., id. at 708.
150. See Leonard D. Duboff & Sally Holt Caplan, Creativity and Copyright, OR. ST. B.
BULL., Jan. 1989, at 4, 5.
151. See, e.g., Scafidi, supra note 146, at 73, 82.
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States’ participation in the Berne Convention.152 If Congress has
already recognized the importance of expanding copyright protection
in response to greater protections afforded by other countries and
coalitions, it follows that the copyright protection currently provided
to fashion designs by the European Union’s regulations now
requires American lawmakers to afford copyright protections to
fashion designs.153
In addition to this trend of looking to other nations who do
provide copyright protection for guidance, changing technology and
the expansion of the Internet have also made it necessary to further
expand copyright protection to fashion designs.154 Technological
advancements in terms of both textile production and mass
production of clothing have made it easier to copy designs in an
inexpensive manner155 and has exacerbated the problems
traditionally faced by fashion designers.156
Congress has responded to technological advancements by
providing different types of intellectual property protections.157 For
example, computer software programming is now able to receive
both software patents and software copyrights.158 Additionally, the
Internet has better facilitated the rapid spread of information and
images.159 As a result, it has become easier for many diverse people
to actually see fashion designs. Not only has the ease with which
people view photographs from runway shows and images of designer
clothing increased, but innovative and diverse fashion blogs have
creatively illuminated the ways in which the same article of clothing

152. See Duboff & Caplan, supra note 150; see also Emma Yao Xiao, Note, The New Trend:
Protecting American Fashion Designs Through National Copyright Measures, 28 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 417, 424 (2010) (arguing that the U.S. should look to other countries for
guidance in protecting fashion).
153. See Brandes, supra note 102, at 1130-31; Xiao, supra note 152, at 424-25, 442
(exploring the European Union’s trend of affording copyright protection in other countries’
intellectual property regimes).
154. See Schutte, supra note 97, at *6-7, ¶11.
155. See id. at *16, ¶ 30.
156. See id. at *17, ¶ 34.
157. See Scafidi, supra note 146, at 74-75, 87.
158. See David R. Ellis, Computer Law: A Primer on the Law of Software Protection, FLA.
B.J., Apr. 1986, at 81, 84.
159. See Schutte, supra note 97, at *6-7, ¶11.
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can mean something completely different on different wearers in
different contexts.160
CONCLUSION
As this Note has demonstrated, America’s current intellectual
property regime unfairly forces unique objects like fashion
designs—objects that possess both utilitarian and artistic
components, and which may appear more utilitarian or artistic
depending on a context-specific analysis—to “chose a side” on the
art-utility spectrum in order to receive some form of intellectual
property protection. Once a fashion design is submitted for either
patent or copyright review, the design’s unavoidable artistic or
utilitarian components stand as effective bars that prevent the
design from actually receiving the desired protection. Given that
both the historical underpinnings of American intellectual property
law and the recent amendments to the Copyright Act of 1976 expose
the artificiality that underlies granting intellectual property
protection is based on such a rigid framework, it is necessary for
lawmakers to abandon the art-utility dichotomy and allow fashion
designs, much like architectural designs, to receive intellectual
property protection. A brief analysis of the Copyright Act of 1976
and the changing norms of international custom and technology
reveal that extending copyright protection to fashion designs is both
workable and necessary.
Intellectual property is concerned with protecting objects that are
either useful or artistic. Fashion designs, works that have far
reaching effects on American lifestyles, culture, and economy,
should not be denied this protection because they are both.
M.C. Miller*

160. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 1, at 1155 (discussing the meaning of fashion); Daryl
Wander, Trendsetting: Emerging Opportunities for the Legal Protection of Fashion Design, 42
RUTGERS L.J. 247, 292 (2010) (describing how fashion blogs are a factor in establishing
meaning in clothing).
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